It correctly observes that once companies become dominant, they stop acting like normal competitors. Instead of just building better products, they lobby regulators, buy potential rivals, and shape markets to protect their position. This pattern is real, widespread, and shows up in every industry, not just tech. That alone should hint that ideology isn’t the cause.

Where the essay goes wrong is treating this as executive confusion or moral contradiction. Executives at dominant firms aren’t confused or especially immoral. At scale, durable dominance and real competition are incompatible. Public companies are punished for slowing down, executive pay is tied to growth and stock price, and losing dominance can end careers even if the company survives. Regulation becomes something to manage or reshape. With weak enforcement, rule-bending is the rational move.

This doesn’t need a moral or psychological explanation. It follows directly from incentives, scale, and governance gaps.

Coherent narrative might help. Framing the problem as bad beliefs (as this essay does), bad people, or “capitalism in general” misses the point and leads to confused demands. Policymakers are pressured by the public to punish individuals or signal virtue which are distractions from effectively funding enforcement, closing loopholes, and limiting power at scale. Meanwhile, clear, well-funded lobbying focuses their attention on their needs.

Clearer public narratives won’t fix the problem by themselves, but they’re a minimum first step. Without a shared understanding of what is wrong and how to fix it, meaningful pressure for reform never even starts.